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Sabdapramana as a Theological Category in
Vedanta Desika's Tattvamuktäkaläpa
Sucharita Adluri

Abstract: This article considers the Sravaisnava theologian Vedanta Desika's
(14th-century CE) understanding of sabdapramana and deference to
sabdapramana that is evident in one of his most important expositions the
Tattvamuktakalapa and its commentary the Sarvarthasiddhi. For Desika,
deference to sabdapramana is motivated by belief in a particular view of
reality. This would be the acceptance of Visnu as the Brahman of the upanisads, his connection to authoritative scripture, and its propagation.
Furthermore, to defer to sabdapramana requires membership in a community
and the requisite pedagogical training that confers the authority needed to
speak for the tradition.

In the context of Indian darsana-s reliance on scripture (sabdapramana) is decisive
in arguments of soteriological import. Other epistemological categories like per
ception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumana) though valid, ultimately defer to the
contents of the Veda on issues of metaphysics and ontology. But what does com
mitment to sabdapramana mean? One way to assess this is by examining intellec
tual discourse that relies on scripture to evaluate the scope of sacred texts in
theological argumentation. That is, an investigation of theological reasoning
through examples that illustrate reliance on scripture. Another avenue of inquiry
is to examine the motivations and qualifications on which deference to
sabdapramana is predicated. This article is concerned with the latter issue.
Examining the discussion of the category of sabdapramana, in a Sanskrit text of
Vedanta Desika (14th-century CE), a proponent of Visixbadvaita Vedanta, this art
icle poses and answers the following questions—‘what does deference to
sabdapramana mean for Desika?' ‘What criteria characterize his commitment to
scripture?' Such an examination, however, does not imply that there is a monolithicunderstandingofrelianceonscripture.Thepresentdiscussiononthenature
of one's reliance on scripture is limited to the context of theological discourse or

sastraic discourse since a practitioner's engagement and understanding of commit
ment to sαbdαprαmα>α may intersect and/or diverge from that of a theologian.
For Desika, reliance on sabdapramana, in the Tattvamuktakalapa (TMK), first and
foremost implies an understanding and acceptance of a set of views about the
supreme deity ViX>u's role as the primal teacher. Second, deference to
sabdapram@>a presupposes membership in a religious community. Third, commit
ment to and reliance on scripture require extensive pedagogical training. Thus,
deference to sabdapramana is a collective endeavour and not the undertaking of a
lone individual. Beginning with a discussion on Sravaisnava theology of which
Desika was a proponent, this article examines each of the three criteria that
inform his understanding of deference to scripture.
Sravaisnava theology
The Sravaisnavas of South India revere the deity Visnu-Narayana and his consort
Sra. Beginning with Nathamuni (9th-century CE), who is considered to be the first
important proponent, the Sravaisnava tradition (sampradaya) undergoes a complex
development of synthesising and systematising the hymns of the Tamil Alvar
saints, the Sanskrit tradition of Vedanta, and Pancaratra. The Srivaisnava inter
pretation of Vedanta called Visistadvaita Vedanta1 articulated by Nathamuni and
then Yamuna (10th-century CE) was further developed by Ramanuja (1077-1157
CE), who is said to have systematised this type of Vedanta. Subsequently, Vedanta
Desika (14th-century CE) consolidates Ramanuja's teachings, defends Visistadvaita
against the criticisms of rival schools of thought, and is recognised as one of its
leading exponents. The primary source for this study is the TMK the most import
ant exposition of Desika along with his commentary, the Sarvarthasiddhi (SS). In its
scope, the TMK as an exposition of Visistadvaita principles is encyclopaedic. In
fact, Desika states that the purpose of this composition is to establish the doctrines
ofVedanta based on a critical evaluation ofteachings advocated by rival schools of
thought,2 and that it is an exhaustive treatise for ‘what is not treated here is not
found elsewhere'.3 We may construe from this that the TMK was intended for
Visixbadvaita theologians and perhaps theologians of rival schools, that is, those
engaged in sastraic discourse. In fact, the Srivaisnava tradition defines the
Sarvarthasiddhi, the commentary on TMK, as an intellectual shield to defend oneself
from the onslaught of outsiders.4
The TMK, which comprises five hundred verses in the srgdhara metre, is divided
into five sections, which are like the strands of the pearl necklace (muktakalapa)
that is the text itself. The five strands (sara) cover topics salient to Visistadvaita
Vedanta, namely, substance (dravya), individual soul (jfva), Brahman (isvara), epis
temology (buddhi), and metaphysical attributes (adravya).5 Scripture and its use as
valid means ofknowledge (pramana) ofBrahman is addressed in the fourth section
titled buddhisara (the knowledge strand) in verses 114-123.6 Here, Desika begins by
differentiating the Veda from extra-Vedic texts, considers the validity ofsmrti as a

basic component of sabdapramana, and concludes with an evaluation of particular
smpti traditions, such as the purana, Pasupata, Samkhya, and Pañcaratra. What is
apparent in this discussion is not only what Desika considers as sabdapramana, but
also what he means by reliance on sabdapramana. That is, according to Desika, a
claim such as, ‘I defer to scripture', in the context of commentarial and exegetical
pursuits, entails a particular cognitive orientation, religious affiliation, and
specialised training. Each of these three criteria is examined in the following
sections.

Visnu and sabdapramana
Deference to Sabdapramana implies an ontological framework. According to
Visixbadvaita, it is the understanding and acceptance that Visnu, the Brahman
of the upanisads is the cause of world production, preservation, and dissolution
and exists in a soul-body relationship with his creation. For Desika and other
Visistadvaitins, Visnu also promulgates the Veda and various smrti traditions,
which comprise the Srivaisnava scriptural canon. This section follows some of
Desika's arguments on the validity of sruti, and smrti traditions such as puranas
and pancaratra, in some detail to illustrate that deference to Sabdapramana pre
sumes the acceptance of a particular set of views about ViX>u's role in the per
petuation and propagation of scripture. In other words, to properly defer to
scripture implies an understanding of ViX>u as the source of all valid scripture
in one sense or another.
Ramanuja,7 Desika's predecessor, describes the function of scripture as follows:
‘therefore, sastra alone is your pramana in determining what is to be done and what
is not, in determining what is to be accepted and what is not. The Veda augmented
(upabpmhita) by the dharmasastras, itihasas, and puranas, teach only the highest
reality called Purusottama, his pleasing form and the actions that are the means to
attain Him.'8 Desika, too, highlights these characteristics of Veda to invoke it as the
organising principle differentiating Vedic and extra-Vedic traditions.9
The use of Veda as a measure of orthodoxy (vedam+la)10 is based on its authorless-ness (apauruseyatva) and its eternality (nityatva). Deliberations on these attri
butes of the Veda were first undertaken by Mimamsa in the context of sacrifice
and the ritual implication of language. These speculations were later translated
into the context ofthe exegetical tradition ofVedanta.11 Although there may seem
to be similarities to the Mimamsa conception of Veda as authorless and eternal,
there are major differences.12 On the one hand, ‘the Veda is authorless and eternal
because it is being uttered in that very order, which is remembered by an impres
sion generated in the order in which it has been uttered again and again previously.'13 On the other hand, Visixbadvaita also takes great pains to describe the
manifestation (aviskr) of Veda by Visnu.

Characteristic of Vedanta, Visixbadvaita subscribes to the periodic dissolution
and production of the world. However, even within this scenario, the Veda is still
authorless and eternal. Ramanuja explains—
when a [great] dissolution14 comes to an end, the Blessed One, the supreme
Person, remembers the previous configuration of the world, and having
resolved, ‘Let me be many', he diversifies [into individual entities] the whole
aggregate of enjoyable [i.e. non-conscious beings] and their enjoyers [i.e. con
scious beings], previously collapsed in himself as but his residual power. Having
created as old the Mahat etc [i.e. the cosmic material principle(s)] and the
Brahma-Egg [or universe itself] right up to Hira>yagarbha, and having mani
fested the Vedas in their traditional order, he imparts them as before to
Hira>yagarbha, instructing him as to the production of the world and compris
ing the forms of gods etc., while he himself remains as its inner self.15

The Veda rooted in Brahman's essence manifests in the same order from epoch to
epoch and therefore authorless and eternal. ViX>u imparts the Veda to Brahma
(Hiranyagarbha/Prajapati), in the same order as before and following this, the
Vedic seers directly perceive or experience the Veda and reproduce and transmit
them unaltered. To defer to the Veda implies an understanding and an acceptance
of the role of Visnu in the process of Vedic transmission. Desika does not mention
all this detail in the TMK, however, as a follower ofRamanuja, he subscribes to this
scenario of ViX>u's role in evoking, manifesting, and transmitting the Veda which
‘reposes' within His consciousness.16 While the role ofVisnu in the propagation of
Veda is implied in Desika's discussion as he is more concerned with refuting the
PrabhakarasandNaiyayikas,inthediscussionofthevalidityofsm rti,heisexplicit
in scripture's connection to ViX>u.
As Visnu's essence, the Veda is authorless, eternal, and beyond the vicissitudes
ofmatter (pradhana), but smrti, which is authored by various sages is susceptible to
the three qualities (guna) of matter (sattva, rajas, and tamas). Desika begins with
some general arguments as to why smrti is a valid means of knowledge of Visnu.
He claims that generally, smpti are declared as equal (samana) to Veda17 by sruti,
eminent teachers, and smrti texts themselves. Thus smrti's validity is rooted in
sruti. Also, both smrti and sruti are said to have the same soteriological goals
(prayojana). This goal that is shared by both types of scripture is of course liber
ation, which is the soul's experience of eternal bliss as defined in the Sravaisnava
context. Subsequently, Desika begins his discussion of the puranas by stating the
first rule in the categorisation of smrti, in Vedanta traditions—if contradiction
with Veda is seen, smrti is rejected as is established by the commentaries on
Brahma Sutras.18 For puranas he notes
similarly, this rule applies to the beginning of puranas due to the possibility
that there could be human errors. If however, there is a contradiction between

the puranas, the order of validity/rule of strength would depend on the division
such as sattvika and so on.19

Puranas that are contradictory to sruti are invalid, but the hierarchy among vari
ous puranas is evaluated based on a classification mentioned in the Matsya Purana,
which accords the highest authority to Vaisnava puranas since they are thought to
be sattvika in nature.20 The rationale is that after Visnu creates Brahma, in epochs
when the latter's sattva dominates he praises Visnu, in epochs when his rajas
dominates; he praises Agni and Siva, and when his tamas dominates he praises
himself. In the mixed epochs the goddess Sarasvati and the Manes are praised.
Although the propagator of the puranas may be Brahma, as an embodied being
comprised of pradhana and its three guna constituents, he cannot escape their
effect. However, since the puranas that revere Visnu are composed when his
sattva guna dominates, they are the most authoritative.
Although Desika, here, does not reject the various puranas as contrary to the
Veda, he does validate the Vainsava ones as most authoritative, especially if there
is a mutual contradiction among these puranas. The classification of puranas,
which is the same as that of Ramanuja, articulates allegiance to Visistadvaita
Vedanta and reads the supremacy of Visnu, the Brahman of the upanisads, into
the categorisation of sectarian puranas. The rationalisation as to why rival puranas
are not valid is ultimately an ontological issue; it is the nature of Visnu's creation.
Smrti texts as authored texts cannot escape the influence of pradhana and are
inherently prone to errors and faults. Visnu, however, does provide an alternative
in the form of Vaisnava puranas that are purely sattvika in nature and thus escape
the effects of the other two qualities of pradhana, rajas and tamas. Visnu does not
promulgate the puranas, but as the sole object of praise of the sattvika-minded
Brahma, and as the eminent object of praise of the Vaisnava puranas his connec
tion to them is significant. Commitment to sabdapramana thus includes knowledge
of and acceptance of Visnu's connection to the most authoritative of puranas.
The discussion of Pancaratra's validity shares some similarities to the purana
debate in that these texts also, since they are authored by embodied beings are
susceptible to the deleterious effects of pradhana. While the argument for the
validity of Vaisnava puranas is based on the sattvika nature of Brahma, Desika
utilises different principles in his refutation of arguments contra- Pancaratra.
The reception of smrti traditions such as Samkhya, Yoga, Pasupata, and
Pancaratra, by other darsana-s has been varied. Kumarila in his Tantravarttika for
instance, denounces these traditions as extra-Vedic, though not completely out
side the bounds of Vedic tradition like Buddhism and Jainism.21 The Mahabharata
(MBh) deems Samkhya, Yoga, and Pañcaratra as smrti traditions that are read
together with the Veda.22 The Brahma Sutras, one of the foundational texts of
Ved@nta reject Sa:khya and Yoga,23 while Pancaratra's status within Vedanta24
is complex, as the interpretations of Sankara and Ramanuja differ vastly. Of these

smrti traditions, it is only Pancaratra that has been adopted into the Vedantic fold
primarily because of Vaisnava Vedanta.
To be sure there are doctrinal differences on the presentation of the highest
reality (tattva) within Samkhya, Yoga, and Pancaratra, but ultimately for Desika,
Pancaratra is valid because it has been taught by Visnu-Narayana himself. In re
gards Samkhya and Yoga he claims,
due to excessive errors, on account of pradhana, there would be doubt of some
good people; read together with sruti, by logic they are not to be refuted, but
the contradiction with sruti is not removed25

Thus, according to him, the MBh is right to advocate their acceptability from the
pointofviewofreasonandlogic. However, these texts arenotfullyVedicbecauseof
the sheer number of contradictions to sruti, and so their validity must be rejected.
However, as a smrti tradition, Pancaratra too is similar to Samkhya and
Pasupata and is not above the effects of pradhana. Desika's reasoning for
Pañcaratra, now, focuses on the role of Visnu in its propagation and transmission.
Pañcaratra is beyond these faults engendered by pradhana, a characteristic of au
thored texts, but through devotees such as Pauskara and Sannilya, Visnu-Narayana
himself, expounds the Pancaratra.26 This is similar to Krsna's role as the teacher of
the Bhagavadgata (BhG). Furthermore, the sages who are the recipients of this
teaching are characterised by sattva and hence above all faults that characterises
association with pradhana.
Unlike Samkhya and Yoga, Pancaratra is authoritative because it is also part of
Visnu's cosmic plan. In BhG 4.8, Krsna claims that he is born repeatedly for the
protection ofthe good people, destruction ofthe wicked, and the establishment of
dharma. Ramanuja commenting on this BhG verse notes that ‘good people' here
refer to the best among the Vaisnavas (vaisnavagresara) who have taken refuge in
Krsna.27 Desika echoes Ramanuja's interpretation of the BhG when he claims, ‘the
activity or manifestation28 of Visnu-Narayana is two-fold-—for leading the asuras
astray and for the protection of his followers. In regard to Pancaratra, the goal is
for the protection of the good people and therefore those completely character
ized by sattva such as Sandilya and so on, are themselves teachers of those texts.'29
Although Desika does not specify what he means by ‘good people', I think
Ramanuja's interpretation from BhG 4.8 can apply. He instructs sages on
Pañcaratra to protect his devotees and since only teachers characterised by
sattva are the mediators, this smrti tradition is above all faults. So, beginning
with his role in the transmission of the Veda, as the auspicious object of the
most authoritative of puranas, as a teacher in the BhG, and now in propounding
the Pancaratra, Visnu is ever-present and persists in conveying different scrip
tures to those who take refuge in him.30
In Desika's refutation of a last objection made by the purvapaksin on the inclu
sion of Pancaratra as sabdapramana and the exclusion of Samkhya, Yoga, and

Pasupata, Visnu's special relationship to Pancaratra is underscored. The objector
claims that since all doctrines (siddhanta) such as Samkhya, Yoga, and so on are
concerned with the all-knowing Isvara's divine cognition, which is eternal, and
‘because, all doctrines are manifested through Isvara; among these, how is
Pancaratra different?'31 Desika replies that Pancaratra is superior to other smrti
traditions ‘because it is spoken by bhagavan, because it is accepted by authoritative
men (adhikari) such as Sannilya who are characterised by sattva, and because it is
not contrary to the Veda, from these and for a hundred other reasons their dif
ference is established'.32 The final justification, however, is that ‘Pancaratra be
cause ofits validity (pramanatva) abides in divine cognition while the other tantras
abide in divine cognition due to their invalidity (apramanatva)'.33 ‘Because Isvara
(Visnu) is all-knowing, Vedas and Buddhist texts and so on abide in his cognition
equally. By this however, there is no similarity among them. It is the same case
here as well, this is the intention.'34 Ultimately, though the all-knowing Visnu is
cognisant of various traditions, he only holds Pancaratra as valid. Thus, these texts
cannot be argued as valid on the mere basis of Visnu's awareness of them.
An examination of Desika's discussion, thus far, illustrates particular connec
tions between Visnu and authoritative scripture in the Sravaisnava understanding
of sabdapramana. Visnu imparts the Veda at the beginning of time through
Prajapati, is linked to authoritative Vaisnava puranas as their sole object of
praise, and now promulgates Pancaratra through worthy men such as Sandilya,
and so on. These examples draw attention to some of the criteria on which com
mitment to scripture is predicated. Deference to sabdapramana for Desika, implies a
set of views on what scripture is and the relationship of Visnu to these texts.
Whereas the understanding and acceptance of scripture discussed thus far may
seem to be just a cognitive attitude, the practical dimensions of what it means to
defer to scripture, according to Desika, are presented in the next two sections.

Religious community and sabdapramana

The second criterion implied in Desika's understanding of sabdapramana is mem
bership in a community. Desika's discussion on the validity of Veda in relation to
extra-Vedic texts underscores the connection between commitment to
sabdapramana and religious affiliation. That is, according to Desika in the TMK,
one properly defers to sabdapramana when one is a member of Vedic society, since
that is the prerequisite for access to relevant scriptures. Elsewhere, Desika notes
that ‘scripture and reason declare unanimously that the distinctions of varna and
jati and the rules of conduct the sastras prescribe accordingly are still fully valid
among Bhagavatas'.35 Such priority given to one's caste and the role of scripture in
attaining liberation is a major doctrinal difference that leads to the TenkalaiVatakalai sectarian rift within Sravaisnavism in the 17th century.36 Nonetheless,
even the Tenkalai sub-sect's appeal to the Tamil Alvar hymns rather than Sanskrit

scriptures does not preclude the importance of religious affiliation in connection
with commitment to scripture.
In his discussion on the validity of sruti, Desika refutes the 10th-century lo
gician, Udayana, author of the Nyayakusumanjali (NK).37 As one of the foremost
proponents of Nyaya-Vaisesika theism, Udayana comprehensively treats sruti's
validity in the context of a rational doctrine of Isvara. One of the arguments in
the Nyaya defence of Veda's validity was that it was accepted by the mahajana.38
Udayana and other logicians utilise the concept of mahajanaparigraha to infer
that the Veda is the work of a trustworthy person.39 That is, the Veda is ac
cepted by the mahajana (mahajanaparigraha) because they are the words of a
trustworthy person, 'svara. For Udayana, mahajana constitutes not just the fol
lowers of Vedic dharma, but exemplary men of other traditions as well. Although
Udayana might seem more catholic in his interpretation of mahajana, he takes
great pains to argue the difference between the mahajana who accept the Vedic
tradition and those who adhere to extra-Vedic traditions.40 Desika rejects this
interpretation of mahajana and it is this section of Udayana's Nyayakusumanjali
that he references in the TMK. While for Udayana, the term mahajanaparigraha is
primarily a corollary in establishing Isvara's authorship of the Veda, for Desika,
acceptance by mahajana is a characteristic feature of Veda alone reflecting cer
tain social distinctions.
Desika's interpretation of this term seems more restrictive in the sense that he
understands it to refer solely to those who accept the Veda. Mahajana are adher
ents ofthe Veda exclusively. He states that only men who are deliberate and wise41
(preksavanto mahanta) accept this endless Veda along with its anga-s.42 Therefore,
the claim that there is equality in the acceptance of Vedic texts and extra-Vedic
texts does not hold. Neither does mahajanaparigraha mean acceptance by a great
number of men, it only means acceptance by excellent men (bahujanaparigrhitatvam na mahajanaparigraha api tu utkrststajanaparigraha). Moreover, the in
tention is that, these wise men accept only the validity of the Veda (sa tu vedesu
eva). For Desika, neither the Veda nor those who adhere to it can in anyway be
compared to the followers ofother traditions. Thus utkrsbajana employing the Veda
as the standard do not expand or spread the extra-Vedic texts in the same way
that they endlessly extend the Vedas because the latter are the limit or boundary
beyond which they do not venture.43 So unlike Udayana, for whom mahajana may
include wise men following even other traditions, for Desika, mahajana by defin
ition can only mean those who accept the Veda.
So, why would unwise men (anutkrstajana) accept the validity of extra-Vedic
texts? According to him, there are two types ofacceptance (parigraha)—acceptance
by someone who is supported by faith (kascid astikyanibandana) and the other,
acceptance by someone because of the desire for trivial aims and goals
(alpalapaprayojanabhilasad apara).44 Moreover, the fact that these men cling to
goals that are unworthy or nastikya is also reflected in their other limitations.
For an enumeration of these limitations, Desika summarises Udayana's discussion

on the differences between those who accept Veda and those who reject it. The
mahajana who accept the Veda, he claims in the NK, are above all faults
Thus indolence etc (alasyadi) cannot account for the acceptance of the Veda; for
it prescribes rites and other observances that are difficult to accomplish. Nor is
the Veda accepted by persons to whom admission has been denied in other
ways of life (such as Buddhism) having other agamas; for even those that are
revered by other ways of life are not admitted as adherents of the Veda.
Likewise, the acceptance of the Veda is not because of heedlessness of the
distinction between lawful food and unlawful food and drinks; for the Veda
precisely aims at establishing the distinction between the two and forbids the
eating and drinking of certain things. The acceptance of the Veda cannot be
due to an illusion resulting from the habit of false reasonings; for the Vedic
observances extend even to children. It cannot be due to deception arising from
association with heretics or imposters; for the Veda and its practices are trans
mitted from father to son.45

Desika, too, notes that ‘limitations46 are seen in those who accept them (extra
Vedic texts) such as—lack ofa foundation, laxity in religious observances, delusion
due to the infatuation with logic, and leniency in food and dress etc—contrary to
what is in the Veda.'47 In his commentary on this verse he elaborates further on
these impediments. The fact that the unwise lack a foundation means that they
have no recourse to any other resource (ananyagati), especially the path of the
Veda; they are lax in behaviour such as having contempt for rules that are en
joined or prohibited (kartavyakartavyaniyama). They are trapped by the deceit of
heretical teachings (parair vancana), the delusion due to the practice of false rea
soning (kutarkabhyasavyamoha), and they are indulgent in food and dress etc
(asanacchadanadisaukarya).
Desika's discussion of the concept of mahajanaprarigraha emphasises commit
ment to the Veda as predicated on a particular social ethic. His interpretation of
the term mahajana as utkrstajana discloses the issue of religious affiliation that is
implied in the commitment to sabdapramana. The Veda and its soteriologic ethic, as
interpreted by Desika, are only accessible to the twice-born that study and practice
the Veda in a particular way. Thus, to defer to the Veda, as Desika understands it,
in the TMK, is to participate in such a religious community.

Pedagogical training and sabdapramana

In addition to membership in a religious community deference to sabdapramana as
exemplified in the TMK, requires specialised training. In the discussion on the
concept of mahajana in the previous section, Desika refutes the argument of the
10th-century logician, Udayana. To accomplish this requires in-depth knowledge
of not only Visistadvaita but also the Nyaya view of sabdapramana. Fluency in such

matters is something accessible only to those trained to speak for the tradition and
not simply a Srivaisnava practitioner. Deference to sabdapramana, according to
Desika's TMK, is not simply an awareness of a list of scriptures that are considered
authoritative. One who is capable of deferring to sabdapramana is also someone
who is trained and knowledgeable to engage in apologetics and rule on disputed
issues. The two examples in this section, illustrate the importance of pedagogical
training for the proper application of sabdapramana. The context of the first illus
tration is the issue of lost Vedic branches as it concerns certain rituals enjoined in
smrti such as the astaka sraddha (funerary) rites, which are not referred to in any of
the existent branches of the Veda. Thus, the presumption that all actions of
Vaidikas are rooted in the Veda is questioned. Various traditions explain this
issue by claiming either that the Vedic branches that mention those texts have
been lost or that the existence of such a Veda must be inferred. The second
example is taken from one of Desika's arguments on the validity of Pancaratra.
The controversy in regard to rites and rituals enjoined by smrti but that are not
found in extant Veda has been dealt with differently by different traditions.48
Desika in the TMK refutes the arguments of the Prabhakaras and Naiyayikas to
establish the Visixbadvaita point of view. This argument is only sketched here, in
brief, since it is really the implication of this argument that is of interest. For the
Prabhakaras, the existence of sruti which form the basis of rites such as astaka are
inferred. Meaning that, as in the present day, in previous times also, Vedic people
were undertaking these rituals in accordance with previously existing smrtis. The
validity of the practices as rooted in an eternal Veda was inferred by one's pre
decessors as is done today. Thus the existence of sruti in which the smrti (such as
that which enjoins astaka and so on) is rooted is arrived at through inference. The
NyayaperspectiveisthatthebranchoftheVedathatistherootofsuchritesand
traditions is presently lost.
Desika's objection to the Prabhakara view is that by not apprehending those
sruti, simply inferring that their existence, would mean that the provenance of
these rites is rooted in blind tradition (andhasantananati) and not rooted in sruti
that is eternal and perceptible.49 Desika's view on this matter is that smrti trad
itions such as the astaka rituals have their origin in sruti that have been studied by
men somewhere (kvapi), because it is sruti (srutitvat). Indeed, sruti is the recitation
in some place of a collection of words with the palate etc. If the condition for
recitation is due to the recognition of an ear and a speaker, how then can sruti be
inferred?50
Desika also rejects the Nyaya argument of the rootedness of the tradition of the
sista-s in lost Vedic sakhas.51 He proposes a distinction between lost (ucchina) sruti
and dispersed (aprakirna) sruti. He is willing to admit that some branches of the
Veda, in the present time, in the present place, can be accepted as lost, but he
cannot agree, if it is said that these sakha-s have been lost in all the lands, for all
time, because something that is eternal cannot be lost.52 Desika rejects the root
edness ofsmrti practices such as astaka simply as tradition (acara) and also objects

to the view of the lost Vedas.53 Both these views go against his definition of sruti as
the eternal essence of Brahman that preexists eternally and is manifest in a par
ticular order and uttered in a specific pattern from time immemorial. To engage in
such exegetical discussions requires a comprehensive interreligious understanding
and an exhaustive knowledge of one's own tradition as well.
The second illustration taken from Desika's defence of Pancaratra, demonstrates
that Pancaratra's claims of superiority were severely criticised by opponents since
certain texts of this smrti tradition claimed supremacy to even the Vedas. For
instance, in the Sattvata Samhita it is said ‘then not gaining the goal by studying the
Vedas and its angas, Sandilya (declared) the Pancaratra tantra'.54 Desika follows his
predecessor Ramanuja in contextualising this statement with reference to the
bhumavidya section of the Chandogya Upanisad (7.1ff). There, it is said that even
though Narada is well versed in all the Vedas and the auxiliary sciences, he is still
ignorant of the self.55 Desika argues that this statement does not mean that this
upanisad rejects the authority of the whole Vedic tradition, it simply means that
its teaching alone will lead to self-realisation. Just as texts like this upanisad
cannot be considered contrary to the Veda, so is the case with Pañcaratra.56
Finally, Desika ends his defence of Pancaratra by referring to Yamuna's
Agamapramanya57 and Ramanuja's Brahmasutrabhasya,58 which he says explains
all these issues and are the foundational texts that prove the authority of the
Pañcaratra smrti.59 Such statements are only meant to praise Pañcaratra but not
devalue the Veda.60 Juxtaposing the TMK, with those of his predecessors, Desika
deftly creates a single curriculum, by resolving contradictions across various texts
and postulating a single unified category of sabdapramana. To defer to
sabdapramana in some ways means an ability to utilise it to such exegetical
ends. This illustration also demonstrates the very important issue of teacherpupil lineage (guruparampara). Desika considers himself a descendent of the lineage
of important Srivaisnava teachers such as Yamuna, and Ramanuja. Exegetical
training, teachers, and years of study prepare one to ably defer to sabdapramana
and are implied in Desika's understanding of deference to scripture. In this sense
reliance on scripture is a feature of the intellectual activity of a religious commu
nity as a whole, it is a communal undertaking and is linked to the propagation and
transmission of a tradition.

Conclusion

Clooney in his seminal article on Hindu theology writes that ‘[r]easoning carried
forward without regard for authoritative religious sources needs to be distin
guished from reasoning marked by attention to scripture and other religious
authorities; the latter is theological reasoning'.61 Visixbadvaita Vedanta's reliance
on scripture certainly qualifies it as theological discourse. Extrapolating what
Desika understands as deference to sabdapramana from his discussion on

authoritative scripture, this article has identified certain criteria on which that
commitment to scripture is predicated in the context of sastraic discourse.
Deference to sabdapramana does not simply mean recognition of certain scrip
tures as authoritative and valid, and their use but an orientation toward these
texts motivated by belief in a particular view of reality. In Sravaisnavism this
would be the acceptance ofVisnu as the Brahman ofthe upanisad, his connection
to authoritative scripture, and in its propagation. Furthermore, to defer to
sabdapramana according to Desika requires membership in a community and the
requisite pedagogical training that confers the authority needed to speak for the
tradition. Certain aspects such as tradition (sampradaya), lineage (para:apara), in
tellectual (sastra) discourse, and authority (adhikara) form the very core of defer
ence to sabdapramana as understood in the Srivaisnava context. Desika's
understanding of deference to sabdapramana carries with it the issues and concerns
ofa whole tradition and to defer to scripture is not an autonomous endeavour. For
Desika then, deference to scripture as a characteristic feature of theology would
include the above-mentioned criteria.
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Notes
1 In this article, the terms Srιvaisnavism and Visixtädvaita Vedänta are used
interchangeably.
2 Varadacharya, TMK 1.1-4; Chari 9.
3 yannasmin kvapi naitat (Varadacharya, TMK 5.134).
4 Nyayasiddhanjana, Chari 8.
5 adravya in Visixtädvaita Vedänta encompasses qualities of a substance that cannot
themselves become substrates for other qualities, such as the three qualities of
prakrti, sound, touch, colour, and so on (Dvivedi, SS 5.2).
6 TMK 4.111—refutation of the Nyäya claim that validity of Veda is due to its com
position by a trustworthy person (isvara). TMK 4.112—refutation of the Nyäya view
that the Veda was at the beginning, undivided into branches. TMK 4.113—argues
the eternality of the Veda (Varadacharya).
7 For more on Rämänuja and scripture see, Adluri (2006).
8 tasmat karyakaryavyavasthitau upadeyanupadeyavyavasthayam sastram eva tava
prama>am. dharmasâstretihâsapurânâdyupabpmhitâ veda yad eva purusottamakhyam
param tattvam tatpranarupam tat praptyupayabhutam ca karma avabodhayanti
(Vararäghaväcärya, RBhGBh 16.24).
9 Varadacharya, TMK 4.114-115.
10 Halbfass (1991, pp. 23-49).
11 Clooney (1987).
12 Beginning with 4.101, Desika considers and refutes the views of rival schools on the
nature of language, knowledge, and the Veda (Varadacharya).
13 etadeva vedanam apauruseyatvam nityatvam ca, yat p+rvap+rvoccara>akramajanita
sa:skarena tameva kramavisesam smptva tenaiva kramenoccaryamanatvam (van
Buitenen, 139).

14 There are two types of dissolution. A partial dissolution is characterised by the
destruction of all creation up to, but not inclusive of Brahm@. During complete
dissolution, all entities including the creator god Brahm@ are absorbed into ViX>u.
15 Lipner (1986, p. 8).
16 Ibid., p. 9.
17 In contrast to Ramanuja, for whom smrti served to augment or corroborate
(upabp:hana) the meaning of the Veda, Desika, at least in the TMK, simply seeks
to prove the equivalence between these two categories of sabdapramana, but stops
short of declaring smrti as apauruseya and nitya. No longer is smrti seen as serving a
corroborative function, but instead once it is deemed valid, it has the same standing
as the Veda.
18 drste vedair virodhe smrtipariharanam sutrabhasyadisiddham (Varadacharya, TMK
4.119).
19 tadvan natih puranaprabhrtisu bhavinam sambhavad vibhramadeh syad anyonyam virodhe
tu iha balaniyatis sattvikadibhedat (TMK 4.119).
20 In the epochs of tamas, the glories of Agni and Siva are praised (Matsya Purana 290.14cd).
And in the epochs of rajas, the greater glory of Brahma is considered (Matsya Purana
290.14ef)
Then in the epochs of sattva, the even greater glory of Hari is sung.
In these ages alone, those perfected by means of yoga, will reach the highest goal.
In the mixed ages, that of Sarasvata and the Manes (Matsya Purana 290.15).
21 Halbfass (1991, p. 61).
22 MBh santiparvan 12.339.111; 349.64.
23 Sa:khya and Pasupata with their considerable divergence in doctrines and the path
to liberation must necessarily be evaluated as invalid. If the Veda, according to
Visistadvaita, declares that Visnu-Narayana is the highest Brahman who is the ma
terial and instrumental cause ofthe universe, the Samkhya claim ofpradhana as the
material cause of the universe cannot be acceptable (Abhyankar, RBrSuBh 2.2.1ff).
Similarly, the Pasupata claim that the material and instrumental cause as distinct
and Pasupati as the latter only, is unacceptable in the context of Vedanta
(Abhyankar, RBrSuBh 2.2.36-39).
24 Visistadvaita's appropriation of Pañcaratra begins with Yamuna and Desika borrows
some of his arguments from him. For more on Yamuna and Pañcaratra see, van
Buitenen (1971) and Oberhammer (1971).
25 bh+yasyarthe pradhane vihitamati sattam samsayasca kvacit syat srutya badham na
rundhe srutisahapabhitir hetvahantavyata ca (Varadacharya, TMK 4.120).
26 pañcrópótrasya kptsnasya vakta narayanah svayam (Dvivedi, SS 4.121).
27 Vararaghavacarya, RBhGBh 4.8.
28 It is unclear if pravrtti should be taken in the sense of Visnu's cosmic actions
generally such as being the primal teacher to Sañdilya and so on, or specific
cosmic activities like the incarnations. Although in the case of Krsna, both inter
pretations apply.
29 dvividha khalu bhagavatah pravptti$ asuramohanartham ósritasamraksanárthañ ca. pancaratre sattvottarajanasamraksa>artham eva pravpttih, ata eva sattvottaras sannilyadaya
evam tacchastra-pravaktara$ (Dvivedi, SS 4.121).
30 For more on Desika's views on Visnu as the primal teacher see Clooney (2005a, 207-9).

31 tasmad isvarapravartye sarvasminn api siddhante sati kasyacit pañcatatrasya ko visesah
(Dvivedi, SS 4.123).
32 atah kvacit pramanye pañcaratrasyaiva pramaanyam bhagavatproktatvat sandilyadisattvottaradhikari-parigrahat vedavirodhabhavat anyasmadapi satasah pratipaditat vaisamyat
siddhyati (Dvivedi, SS 4.123).
33 apramanatvena tantrantaranisvarabuddhisthani pramanatvena pañcamtram iti (Dvivedi,
SS 4.123).
34 isvarasya sarvajnatvena tadbuddhisthatvam vedanam buddhagamadinamapi samanam.
naitavata tatra samyam. tadvad atrapiti bhavah (SS 4.123).
35 Mumme (2009, p. 182).
36 Ibid., pp. 167-84.
37 Chemparathy (1972).
38 Due to the ambiguous meaning of mahat, mahajana can have a qualitative or quan
titative connotation, as ‘wise men' or ‘a great number of men', respectively.
Udayana, however, retains both connotations and interprets the term as
bahutvatisaya—many eminent persons. See Chemparathy (1987, pp. 67-80).
39 Chemparathy (1987) examines Udayana's argument on this matter in detail.
40 Nyayakusumanjali (NK), stabaka 2, pp. 302-3.
41 I translate mahantah qualitatively as this is Desika's intention.
42 preksavanto mahantah parijagphur imam sadharm angair anantam (Varadacharya, TMK
4.114).
43 nettham prasrtir (Varadacharya, TMK 4.114).
44 Dvivedi, SS 4.114.
45 na hyatra alasyadir nimittam. duhkhamayakarmapradhanatvat. napyanyatra siddhapramanye' bhyupaye' nadhikarena asmin ananyagatikataya anyapravesah. paraih
pujyanamapyatrapravesat. napi bhakxyapeyadyadvaitaragah, tad vibhagavyavasth
aparatvat. napi kutarkabhyasa ‘hitavyamohah. akumaram pravrtteh. napi sambhavad
vipralimbhapasannasamsargah pitradikramena pravarttanat (Padmaprasada and Sastri,
302; Chemparathy translation 1987, p. 75).
46 upadhi or upadhi is in the singular even though it refers to a list of limitations. It is
singular with the intention of relation to each one of the limitations, ‘upadhir iti
ekavacanam pratyekanvayatatparyena'' (Varadacharya 2004, p. 669).
47 dpsyante gatyabhαvo niyatisu laghima vancanam tarkamoho vrttisvasthyadi
caisamupadhiradhigame vaiparatyam tu vede (Varadacharya, TMK 4.114).
48 Pollock (2005, pp. 51-52).
49 Varadacharya, TMK 4.117; Dvivedi, SS 4.117.
50 srutitve
nityanumeyatvavyaghatat
talvadivyaparaih
kvacid
uccaryamane
varnasamghatavisesa eva hi srutih. tasya kathan nityanumeyatvam uccaranadasayam
vaktrsrotror upalambhat (Dvivedi, SS 4.117).
51 sakhocchedastv idanim iha yadi sa matah sarvatas ced asiddhih (Dvivedi, TMK 4.117).
52 Varadacharya, TMK 4.118; Dvivedi, SS 4.118.
53 Fn 18, in Pollock (2005, p. 52).
54 tarhi sangesu vedesu nixbham alabhamanah sαndilyah pancaratratantram adhitavan
(Dvivedi, SS 4.121).
55 Ch Up 7.1.2-3.
56 Also mentioned in Abhyankar, RBrSuBh 2.2.43.

57 van Buitenen (1971).
58 These issues are treated in Rämänuja's Brahmautrabhasya 2.2.40-43 and Yämuna's
?gama-pramanyam. Also see Oberhammer (1971) on Yämuna's interpretation ofsaid
Brahma Sutras.
59 etaccagampramanye bhasyadau ca vistarenanusamdheyam (Dvivedi, SS 4.122).
60 Also mentioned in Abhyankar, RBrSuBh 2.2.43.
61 Clooney (2005b, p. 449). His discussion of substantive issues that characterise the
ology is sufficiently broad to include Buddhist theology as well, see Cabezon (1999).
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